IN RE FENNERSTEIN'S CIIAMPAG1E.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
IN RE FENNERSTEIN'S CIIAMIAGNE.
In order to show the actual market value of articles of merchandise at a particular place in a foreign country, letters by third parties abroad to other third
parties-offering to sell at such rates--if written in ordinary course of the business
of the party writing them, and contemporaneously with the transaction which is
the subject of the suit, are admissible as evidence, even though neither the writers
or the recipients of the letters are in any way connected with the subject of the suit,
and though there is no proof that the writers of the letters are dead.

ON a libel of information and seizure in the District Court for
the Northern District of California, the question was whether
certain champagne wines made at Rheims, in France, and invoiced
for this country in October 1863, had been knowingly invoiced
below "the actual market value of them at the time and place
when and where manufactured," at which actual value the statute
requires that they should be valued. Upon the trial, as appeared
by the bill of exceptions, the claimants introduced testimony tending to show that champagne wines in the hands of the nhnufacturers in the Champagne district of France, in a manufactured
state, ready for consumption, have no fixed actual market value,
and are not sold or dealt in at the place of production. To rebut
this evidence and for the purpose of showing that such wines are
held for sale at current rates and prices, at which they are freely
offered and sold there, and also to show, among other things, the
market value of the wines in question, the United States offered
in evidence seven letters, dated on and between October 27th
1863 and May 12th 1864, from various persons, large dealers at
Rheims, where, as already said, the wines were manufactured.
One will exhibit the type of all:"Rheims, 29th of April 1864.
"Mr. Amos HILL, of California, Edwards's Hotel, Hanover
Square, London.
"I received the letter which you have done me the honor to
write to me, under date of Liverpool, 26th instant, and I hasten
to answer it. I sell only one single quality of champagne wine,
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Qualit Superieux' (Eugene Clicquot brand). The price of this
wine is 4 francs the bottle, and f. 4.25 the two half-bottles, taken
at Rheims, packing included; and I allow 3 per cent. discount
for payment in cash. I know perfectly well the kind of wine
which suit the American taste. My brand is also very highly
appreciated in New York and California. I have put the price
at the lowest that I can sell wine, in consideration of the importance of your orders, and in the hope of establishing permanent
relations with your respectable house.
"Accept, Monsieur, my hearty salutations,
"EUGENE CLIQUOT."

To the introduction of il these letters the claimants' counsel
objected, assigning the same grounds which were assigned against
the introduction of certain prices current in the case of -Ciiquot's
Champagne, 3 Wallace (not yet published), to wit: that they were
immaterial and irrelevant, because they referred to champagne
wines, different in kind, quality, and price from those proceeded
against in this action; because no actual sale or purchase had been
or was proposed to be proved, based upon or connected with the
letters offered-assigning also as ground additional that these
letters were res inter alios acta, and that the letters in reply to
which they were written were not produced.
The court below (Mr. Justice OGDEN HOFFMAN) admitted the
letters, and the government had judgment. On error here their
admissibility was the point discussed.
D. B. Eaton, for the claimants.-The theory of the law of evidence, on which these letters were received, would seem to have
been this: that when the question is, whether there is a market
price for an article, and what the same is at a specific time and in
a given city, in a foreign country, the facts relative thereto may
be proved by reading in evidence whatever any manufacturer of
the article referred to has written on the subject at any time,
within about a year of the date in question, to anybody else in
any part of the world; and that this may be done when all the
letters, to which those read are responses, are withheld.
Independently of all the objections which in the case of (liquot's
Champagne were made to certain prices current there offered, and
which apply as well to these letters, the objection of res inter alios
acta has direct and the strongest bearing.
VOL. XIV.--3 0
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The Attorney-General, and Lake, District Attorney for California, contrA.
Mr. Justice SwAYiE delivered the opinion of the court:
The only point of the several objections taken to the admission
of the letters, necessary to be considered, is, that they were res
inter alios acta, and hence incompetent. The others are disposed
of by what was said in the case of (liquot's Champagne.
In Taylor eg al, v. The United States, 3 Howard 210, foreign
invoices relating to goods other than those of the claimant, and
received by other merchants, were admitted to rebut the evidence
given by the claimant of a general usage to allow a deduction of
5 per cent. for measurement-those invoices showing no such
allowance-and a foreign letter attachied to one of the invoices,
though objected to, was also received. This court approved the
ruling of the court below. In the case of FThgene"Cliquot's
Champagne, just decided, we held that the answer of a dealer,
and a price current, relative to the prices of his wines, given by
him to a witness, were competent evidence.
In Doe d. Patteshall v. Turford, 8 Barn. & Adol. 890, it was
held by the King's Bench that the entry by an attorney of the
service on a tenant of a notice to quit, made in the ordinary course
ptapylton v. Clough, 22 Eng.
of his business, was admissible. In
L. & Eq. 276, a like entry made by an attorney'b clerk, contemporaneously with the service, was held to be admissible for the
same reasons; but the after parol declaration of the clerk, offered
to contradict the entry, was rejected. Inothis case Lord CAIPBxLL said, "I entirely approve of the decision in Doe d. Patteshall v. Turford, and the cases decided upon the same principle.
They lead to the admission of sincere evidence , and aid in the
investigation of truth."
In Carrolv. TNfler, 2 Harr. & Gill 56 ; in Sherman v. Crosby,
11 Johns. 70 ; and in Searman v. Akens, 4 Pick. 283, cases in
Maryland, New York, and Massachusetts, the receipts of third
persons for money paid to them by one of the parties to the suit
were received in evidence without the presence of the persons by
-whom the receipts were given. In Holladayt, F ecutor of LittTe.
.page,v. Littlepage, 2 Munford 316, in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia, the parol declaration by a third person of
such payment was admitted. In Alston v. Taylor, I Haywood
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895, in North Carolina, a receipt given by an attorney of another
state for certain claims placed in his hands for collection was held
to be admissible to show the time at which he received the claims.
In Pratherv. Johnson, 3 Harr. & Johns. 487, the Court-of Appeals of Maryland said: "If A., as surety of B., pays a debt due
to C., on proof of the payment A. could recover of B. He could
recover on C.'s sayinghe had paid, and of course if C. wrote tha
A. had paid, surely it is evidence, whether the writing is in a book
or a letter."

We think the letters in question in this case were properly
admitted. In reaching this conclusion we do not go beyond the
verge of the authorities to which we have referred. In some of
those cases the person claimed to be necessary as a witness was
dead. But that can make no difference in the result: 1 Greenl.
on Evid., § 120; Holladay v. Littleyage, 2 Munford 821. The
rule rests upon the consideration that the entry, other writing, or
parol declaration of the author, was within his ordinary business.
In most cases he must make the entry contemporaheously with the
occurrence to which it relates: Stap/lton v. Cloulh , 22 Eng.L.
& Eq. 276. In all, he has full knowledge, no motive to falsehood,
and there is the strongest improbability of untruth. Safer sanctions rarely surround the testimony of a witness examined under
oath. The rule is as firmly fixed as the more general rule to
which it is an exception. Modem legislation has largely and
wisely liberalized the law of evidence.
We feel no disposition to contract the just operation of the rule
here under consideration.
Judgment affirmed.
Justices WAYNE, CpIFFoRD, and DAvis declared their inabilityk

to assent to so much of the preceding opinion as decides that the
letters, written by third persons, and addressed to third persons,
were properly admitted in evidence
The question considered and decided
in the foregoing case, is whether the
letters admitted in evidence came within
that numerous class of cases embracing
entries and declarations made in the
usual course of business, and therefore
admissible as evidence of the facts therein
recorded. Some of the circumstances

of the case, particularly the fact that the
letters referred to passed between parties
in no way connected with the litigants,
coupled with the dissent of three judges
upon that very ground, at first leave the
impression that perhaps the court bas
exceeded the limits of the authorities on
this subject; but it is believed that the
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decision, except in the one particular
of not requiring proof of the death of
the persons writing the lttcrs, may be
well sustained by principle as well as
authority.
All acts, declarations, &c., made by
third persons are obnoxious to two
objections. First. That they are res
inter alios acta, and therefore irrelevant.
Second. That they are mere hearsay,
the assertions of parties without the
sanction of an oath and an opportunity
But entries
for cross-examination.
against interest, and in the course of
business, have always been considered
as limitations of the rule excluding the
first, and they are admitted, :not because
the acts or admissions of third parties
can ever bind others, but because they
are evidence, just as the same parties'
oath would be, of the facts therein stated.
The peculiar circumstances under which
they are made are considered quite as
efficient a safeguard against falsehood as
an oath, and when the opportunity for
cross-examination is forever lost by the
parties' death, such entries and declarations are freely admitted in evidence in
suits between other parties.
The very origin and nature, then, of
this kind of evidence presupposes that
it was made by third persons, not parties
to the suit nor necessarily connected
with them, but which is admitted because
the law considers it sufficiently worthy
of credit for communication to the jury.
Now, the only difference perceied
between the ordinary cases on this subject and the principal case is the fact
that the entries or declarations here consisted of, or were contained in, letters
written, not only by third persons, but
to third persons, none of whom were
connected in any way with the parties
to the suit. We do not see why this
-bhould make them objectionable!
In the most numerous instances of
these entries (in the course of business)
in notaries', physicians', clerks', &c.,-

books, they are made and completed by
the single act of one person : and it is
only in the case of letters or papers
intended for communication and transmission to others that the supposed difficulty of the principal case is introduced.
Unless letters and such papers are altogether excluded from the class of
entries and declarations we are considering, it does not seem that the mere fact
that they pass between third persons,
instead of remaining in the custody of
one, presents any reason for their exclusion. Such a circumstance should add
to their credibility. Of course all such
entries must relate to the subject-matter
of the suit or some fact arising therein.
A great number of authorities exist
on this subject, and, in perhaps all the
states, such entries have been fully admitted. *Whatevervariance in the course
of decision exists is to be found on the
subject of a component point in the
principal case, viz., the requirement
of the death of the party making such
entries before the same become evidence;
and in the generality of the opinion upon
this point the court is opposed by all the
English and many American authorities.
It is well settled that in the class of
cases embracing ehtries against interest
the fact of the declarant's death must be
shown before their admission, but it has
been contended that a different rule
applies to entries in the course of business, and that they are admissible without regard to the fact of death, and 1
Greenleaf's Evid. § 120, is cited in support of this idea. It certainly is not to
be found anywhere else; for the authority relied upon, the opinion of a
in Doe v. Tursingle judge (PnxE',
ford), is misapprehended. That judge,
in distinguishing between the two kinds
of entries, does not contrast them as to
the fact of a person's death, but as to
the time at which they must have been
made (entries in the course of business
only require to be contemporaneous with
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the fact recorded). Mforeover, in that
case, the party who had made the entry
was dead. In both classes the circumstances under which they were made are
considered equal to an oath, but only in
default thereof when it cannot be obtained. In neither case are they thereby
made original evidence. They are exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay;
but admitting them to be evidence at all
immediately subjects them to another
rule, discrimindtng between primary
and secondary evidence and requiring
the best evidence to be produced. While
the declarant is living his own sworn
declaration is certainly inferior to his
examination under oath.
In all the cases, therefore, the fact or
necessity of the party's death is recognised, or at least some account of him
must be given, and no case has been
found in which the entries were admitted
irrespective of his death or whereabouts.
In Chambers v. Bernasconi, 1 Cr., M.
& R. 347, Lord DENmAx, after stating
the proposition in regard to such entries
in terms in which the death of declarant
was included, said, "All the terms of
the legal proposition above are manifestly essential to render the certificate
admissible." And the best text-writers
agree hereon: 1 Starkie 66, 465; 1
Phillips 347 (4th Am. ed.); and 1
Smith's Lead. Cas. 394-5.
fr. Greenleaf himself, in another section, vol. 1,
115, says, "If the party be living and
competent to testify, it is deemed necessary to produce him."
Many of the American cases have
adhered to the strict requirement of precedent death, while some have relaxed.
the rule somewhat, and admitted entries,
where the author was shown to be out of
the state or beyond the reach of the process of the court, which they say is
equivalent to death.
In New York, if the party be living,
though out of the state, he must be

called or examined on commission:
Brewster v. Doane, 2 Hill 537. And in
Alabama (Moore v. Andrews, 5 Porter
107) absence from the state is held not
sufficient to admit entries upon proof of
handwriting. The cases of Kennedy v.
Fairman, 1 Hayw. 458, and Whitfield v.
Walk, 2 Hayw. 24 (North Carolina),
are to the same effect.
In Pennsylvania, absence from the
state or jurisdiction of the court, so far
as it affects the admissibility of secondary
evidence, has the same effect as death:
Alter v. Berghaus, 8 Wright 77 ; Bank
v. Whiteldll, 16 S. & R. 90. So in
South Carolina (Elms v. (hevis, 2 McCord 349), and Maryland (15 Md. 523),
where the clerk was out in Australia,
and had not been heard from for a long
time.
Some American cases have indeed
extended the principle of the admission
of this class of entries by admitting
them during the parties' lifetime, when
they are verified and authenticated by
the oath of the party making them,
though he cannot remember any thing
about the facts therein stated: Bank v.
Boraef, 1 B. 152; Bank v. Culver, 2
Hill 531; Sisces v. Bank, 4 Md. 418';
and 1 Fla. 322. In such cases they are
essentially the oath of the party, and
present a very different case from mere
*proofof his handwriting.
Though the fact in the principal case
that the party writing the letters was in
a foreign country would seem to bring
it within the more liberal American
decisions, it will be seen that the general
statement made therein, following Mr.
Greenleaf, that all such entries are admissible, irrespective of death, is not
borne out; for in those cases admitting
them when witness is absent it is expressly upon the ground that absence is
equivalent to death, and if he is present
he at least must be called to verify them.
T. H.
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Court of Appeals of Maryland. "
PATRICK BANNON, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND JAMES COUGHLAN,
v. THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. PATRICK
BANNON, BY HIS NEXT FRIEND JAMES COUGHLAN.
Proof of Negligene.-The general practice of the defendants in running their
cars backwards across the streets of a city while the engineer is too remote to see
the track, and while there is no one upon the cars to look out for persons or pro-

perty liable to be injured thereby, is no ground of inferring negligence against
them. The question to be determined is whether there was negligence at the
particular time when the injury occurred. The inference in that direction is rather
weakened than strengthened by showing such general practice.
Degree of care required of partiesstanding in similarrdations.-Railway com-

panies operating their trains along or across the streets of a city are bound to
exercise ordinary care to do it in such a manner as not to inflict injury upon persons or property lawfully using the same streets. And persons so exposed to
injury are bound to exercise similar caution to avoid such injury.
Question of Law.-It is a question of law how far the evidence in the case will
justify a finding 6f gross negligence.

Degree of care required towards children of tender age.&-Damages.-The law
requires the same degree of care and diligence towards all persons, without distinction of age or capacity, and the same rule of damages applies to all.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
BowiE, C. J.-These appeals are taken from the rulings of the
court below, excluding certain evidence offered on the part of the
appellant, Bannon, and rejecting certain instructions offered by
the plaintiff and defendants, and the granting of others in lieu
thereof by tle court, from which rulings each party appealed.
The cause of action is injury sustained by.the plaintiff, through
the alleged wrongful act, neglect, or default of the defendants or
their agents, whilst moving their engine and cars in reversed
order, over a semi-circular track called a Y, on the Locust Point
branch of the defendants' road.
After evidence of the injury, for the purpose of showing negli
gence, the plaintiff proposed to prove it was the daily practice of
the defendants to move their cars, without a guard at the rear of
the train, over the Y, which was so situated that the engineer at
the engine could not see the rear, which evidence the court rejected,
being of opinion the testimony must be confined to the mode in
which the cars were managed at the time of the occurrence of the
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injury complained of; which constitutes the ground of the plaintiff's first exception.
There can scarcely be a question about the propriety of the
court's decision on this exception.
The general conduct of the defendants was not in issue. They
were not required to meet such an investigation by the pleadings.
The acts and omissions of their servants and agents at other times, furnished no legitimate evidence of their conduct upon the particular occasion referred to; and if they did, the safe conduct of
the cars for a long time before without injury, would rather tend
to mitigate than inflame the injury, showing there was no danger
to the community in that mode of managing the cars. The evidence was collateral and incapable of affording any reasonable
presumption or inference as to the matters in issue, and properly
excluded. Vide 1 Greenl., § 52. The first and second prayers
of the plaintiff, referring exclusively to the measure of damages,
will be considered in connection with the instruction of the court
upon that subject.
The series of instructions offered by the defendants, substantially affirms1st. If the place where the accident happened was not a thoroughfare and used as such, or being crossed at the time by the
plaintiff, and the cars were moving at a speed which would have
permitted either adult or child to have avoided them, had he been
using the street as a thoroughfare, or crossing the same, if he had
used such diligence as was reasonably to have been expected of
him, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
2d. If the plaintiff was, just before the accident, playing in a
place of safety, and seeing the cars, ran and jumped on them, and
fell off and was injured, he is not entitled to recover, although
the jury believe the defendants did not use the care and diligence
that would have prevented him from getting on the cars.
3d. If, in addition to the above facts, the plaintiff had been
warned, and was of an age to understand such warning, and to
know he was doing wrong, he is not entitled to recover, although
the defendants had not used such care and diligence as would
have prevented plaintiff .from getting on the cars.
4th. If, at the time of the accident, the defendants were not
complying with the ordinances offered in evidence regulating the
use of locomotive engines in the city of Baltimore, yet the plain-
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tiff is not entitled to recover, if the jury believe that his conduct
was the immediate cause of the accident, and his injury the result
of a want on his part of that degree of care which was, under all
the circumstances, naturally and reasonably to be expected in one
of the plaintiff's age and intelligence.
The instruction of the court is silent as to the place being a
thoroughfare, but affirms, if the defendants were owners of the
track, along which their cars were drawn or propelled about the
business of the company, then in the management and movement
of said cars the company was bound to exercise the utmost care
and diligence which it was within their means and power to
employ, to prevent accidents endangering the lives of the people
of the city; and if the jury find the plaintiff was injured by the
defendants' cars, and if the defendants, in the use of their cars,
had exercised the htiglest degree of care and diligenco which it
was in their means and power to employ, the said accident could
have been prevented, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover ; but,
although the jury might find that the said accident could have
been prevented by the use of such care and diligence on the part
of the defendants, yet the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, if
the jury believed the accident could have been avoided by the
exercise of that degree of care by said plaintiff, which was, under
the circumstances, to be naturally and reasonably expected from
one of the plaintiff's age and intelligence.
The theory of the defendants' prayers, taken collectively, is,
that if the injury was owing to the want of the reasonable care
and diligence on the part of plaintiff, the defendants are not liable,
although they might have prevented the accident by the exercise
of the 'utmost care and diligence. The theory of the court's
instructions is, that the defendants, in the movement and management of their engines and cars, were bound to use the utmost care
and diligence, and if, by so using it, the accident might have been
prevented, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless the jury
believe the accident could have been avoided by the exercise
of such care as was reasonably to have been expected from the
plaintiff.
The difference between the two propositions is, that under the
court's instruction the defendants were bound to use the utmost
care and diligence) and if the defendants were not in default at
all, and the plaintiff was, he cannot recover. Under the defend.
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ants' prayer, a'though the defendants were in default, yet the
plaintiff cannot recover, if his own want of care, &c., was the
cause of his injury.
In the case of The State, to use of Coughlan, v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co., ante, p. 397, we have pointed out the different
degrees of diligence required by law of carriers of passengers, &c.,
towards those with whom they are in the relation of carriers by
contract or trust and confidence, and the degree of diligence
required of them towards third persons, merely in the exercise of
their legal rights. In the former case, as lately decided by this
court in the case of Jforthington v. The Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Co., the defendants are required to use the utmost care
and diligence, but in the latter, they are required only to exercise
such care and skill as persons of ordinary prudence use and practise about their business. Vide 8 Barb. 368; Railroad Co. v.
Xorton, 24 Penna. 465.
WILLARD, J., delivering the opinion of the court in the case of
Brand v. The Troy and Schenectady Railroad Co., tises this
emphatic language: "But a passenger on board a stage-coach or
railroad car, and a person walking on foot in the street, do not
stand in the same relation to the carrier. Towards the one the
liability of the latter springs from a contract, express or implied,
and upheld by an adequate consideration. Towards the other, he
is under no obligation but that of justice and humanity. While
engaged in their lawful business, oth are bound to use a degree
of caution suited to the exigencies of the case ; the one to avoid
the occasioning an injury, and the other to avoid receiving it.
What that degree of caution is, which they are respectively bound
to exercise, may be seen by a brief consideration of the degrees
of care which the law exacts from persons engaged in the various
pursuits of life."
After reviewing the different degrees of diligence and care
required of bailees and others, he proceeds: "In general, the
highest diligence is not exacted of any person except where a
compensation is paid for the service, or the party injured was in
the power and under the control of the defendant, as in the case
of stage passengers ; or the party officiously obtrudes his services
upon another; or is the sole party deriving a benefit from the
act ; or the party occasioning the injury was in the wrong place,
or engaged in an unlawful calling." If both parties stand on an
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equality as to means of avoiding the accident, and both are
engaged in a lawful employment, it is hard to conceive how more
than ordinary diligence can be demanded: 8 Barb. Sup. Ct. Rep.
878, 880. This language was used in the case of an injury
inflicted on a woman while walking on the track of a railway, in
the streets of a city. In illustration of the same principle---" One
who was engaged upon the track of a railway, by the direction of
the superintendent of the company, and was injured by the engine
of another company lawfully upon the track, could not recover of
the latter company, although their engineer was guilty of carelessness, being himself also in fault:" Railroad Co. v. Norton,
24 Penna. 465.
The-first instruction granted by the court required the jury to
find the exercise of the utmost care and diligence which it was
within the means and power of the defendants to employ to prevent accidents endangering the lives of the people, to exonerate
the defendants from liability, unless they should find the accident
could have been avoided by the exercise of that degree of care by
the said plaintiff, which was, under the circumstances, to be expected from one of the plaintiff's age. This was exacting more
than "the law required of the defendants, as it would seem from
the authorities cited, and therefore erroneous.
The second instruction given by the court was intended as a
substitute for the first and second offered by the plaintiff, prescribing the kind and measure of damages. These, upon the
assumption that the injury was caused by gross negligence of the
defendants, authorized the jury to allow "such punitive or exemplary damages, as in their discretion they might think right and
proper under the circumstances."
2d. That they were 'not
limited to the actual pecuniary injury they might believe the
plaintiff has suffered, but were at liberty to award damages for all
future pecuniary damages which would result from the injury,
and also such damages as would be an adequate compensation for
the pain and illness consequent upon the injury complained of.
The first of the plaintiff's prayers was liable to objection, for
the unlimited discretion it proposed to give the jury, without any
guide to its exercise ; the pernicious tendency of which practice
has been so strongly exposed in the cases cited by this court, in
the case of the State, use of Coughlan, against the defendants;
and without adopting or denying the proposition so elaborately
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discussed by the learned jurists, Sedgwick and Grecnleaf, that
4Cwherever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or
oppression mingle in the controversy, instead of adhering to the
system or even language of compensation, the law permits the jury
to give what it terms punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages,"
its application must entirely depend upon the circumstances of thecase and the evidence in the cause.
There is no element of fraud, malice, or oppression in this case:
but the inquiry is, was there gross negligence ? Gross negligence
is a technical term ; it is the omission of that care "which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to tale of their own
property ;" it is a violation of good faith: Angell on Carriers,

§ 10.

-

It implies malice and evil intention. Hence, in all questions
of punitive or vindictive damages, the intention of the-defendant
is a material consideration.
"What is, and what is not gross negligence, is often a mixed
question of law and fact :" Angell on Carriers, §§ 22, 27 ; Peirce
on American Railroad Law 282, 283. Whether malice or gross
negligence existed is a question for the jury; but what facts are
'sufficient to prove malice or gross negligence, is in such cases the
province of the court to determine. ' The judge is to inform the
jury as to the degree of diligence, or care, or skill, which the law
demands of the party, and what duty it devolves on him, and the
jury are to find whether that duty has been done: Huinter v.
Caldwell, 11 Jur. 770; 10 Ad. & El. 69; 11 M. & W. 817,
and other cases cited by Greenleaf, note 1 to § 49, p. 70, 11th
edition.
The law requiring of the defendants only ordinary care and
diligence towards third persons, not passengers, or connected with
the defendants by contract, trust, or confidence, there was no
evidence of gross negligence which would warrant the court to
instruct the jury, that if they should find such on the part of the
agents of the defendants, they might allow punitive or exemplary
damages. The prayer was, for this additional reason, properly
rejected.
The case being divested of all aggravating circumstances, the
second instruction granted by the court enumerated all the elements of compensatory damages which properly belonged to it.
The infancy of the plaintiff does not change either the degree
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of care or diligence to be used by the defendants in the manage
ment of their cars and engines, or enhance the measure of damages
to be adopted by the jury. The rules regulating the rights and
duties of persons natural and artificial to each other must be
uniform; they cannot vary according to the years or degree of
intellect of natural persons, without producing an uncertainty in
the law destructive of all principle. For this reason, and others
which might be suggested in the conflict of decisions, we think
those of Hartfield v. .Roper, 21 Wend. 615, and Willetts v.
Buffalo and Roc1hester Railroad Co., 14 Barb., are to be preferred to Ly/nch v. Nurdin, 1 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 29.
In Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, the action was by an
infant two years old. He was in the sleigh-path alone, and was
run over and injured. It was held that no action would lie, if the
injury was not voluntary or from culpable neglect.
The rule of negligence was applied to the case, and the want
of care on the part of the parents was regarded as a want of care
on his part.
Willetts's case was that of an infant left by his father in the
cars, and put out by the conductor, ignorant of his lunacy, in con.
sequence of his failing to show his ticket; afterwards he was run
over by another train and killed; it was held the negligence of
the parents was the negligence of the child, and his administrator
could not recover. The general principle is thus announced:
"All persons incapable of diligence should and- usually have
guardians to care for them; upon them the duty of care and diligence is devolved, and their negligence must, in law, be regarded
as the negligence of the incapable infant or lunatic, when they
have been injured in cases arising between them and third persons
acting without notice.
It results from what has been said, that the defendants were
bound, in the management of the engine and trains, to use such
diligence and care as prudent and discreet persons would use and
exercise on such occasions, having due regard to the safety of
property and persons, with such motive-power and trains; and if,
owing to the absence of such diligence and care, the plaintiff was
injured, he was entitled to recover, unless, from his own negli.
gence or want of reasonable care, he brought the injury upon
himself.
The defendants' 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th prayers are defective, in
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not presenting this alternative distinctly to the jury. They enumerate certain facts and specify a certain want of care in preventing the plaintiff from getting on the cars, but do not refer to
the absence of ordinary care and diligence, in the general management of the engine and train on that occasion, as an element of
the condition on which would necessarily depend the right of the
plaintiff to recover.
The conclusion from the foregoing is, that the court below was
correct in rejecting the evidence set out in the plaintiff's exception, and in rejecting the plaintiff's and defendants' prayers ; and
also, in giving its second instruction; but that there was error in
the first instruction granted by the court; hence, the judgment
below must be reversed, and aprocedendo awarded.
There can be no question of the general soundness of the two first propositions of law maintained in the foregoing
case, with the qualification that in all
cases care and diligence, as well as skill,
must be in proportion to the difficulty
and the danger of the business.
What is said in regard to the degree
of care and watchfulness to be exercised
towards children of tender age, is liable
to some question, perhaps, in the broad
sense in which it is laid down.
We apprehend there is no ground of
doubt that where the infant, through its
own want of knowledge and discretion,
wanders into a place where it is injured
without fault on the part of the defendant, or without such fault as would ordinarily result in such injury, there can be
no recovery. But where the defendant
is first in fault, in placing engines or
machinery in such a position as to naturally tempt such infant into peril, and
that result follows, without more fault or
negligence than it was natural to expect
of one of that tender age, the defendant
is responsible for the consequences, notwithstanding there may have been some
degree of want of discretion in those
having the care of such infant, and'notwithstanding a person of adult age and

ordinary discretion might have avoided
the injury.
The recent cases upon this point are
considerably numerous. Is was at one
time doubted, in England, whether any
damages could properly be recovered on
account of the death of a child of such
tender years as to be unable to cam any
thing: Bramhall v. Lee, 29 Law Timcs
111. But in New York, in the case of
Oldfidd v. New Tork 6- Harlet Ptail.
road Company, 3 E. D. Smith 103; s. c.
4 Kenan 310, it was held that where
the plaintiff's daughter, a child of seven
years of age, was killed by one of defendants' cars being drawn over her in
the streets of New York, the mother, a
widow, was entitled to recover all prospective damages arising from the probability of support from such child, and that
the jury were not limited to a strictly
-pecuniary estimate, but might anard
such a sum as they deemed reasonable
under all the circumstances. And a
verdict of $1300 was not considered as
calling for the interference of the court.
And in Singleton v. Thc Eastern
Counties Railway Company, 7 C. B. N
S. 287, where a child three and a half
years old strayed upon a railway and
had its leg cut off by a passing train, in

BANNON v. RAILROAD CO.
the absence of all proof that the child
came upon the railway through the negligence or default of the company, it
was held no action could be maintained
against them. The court, however, disclaim all purpose of qualifying any of
the former cases. And in a somewhat
recent case in the Exchequer Chamber
(WVaite v. The North Eastern Railway
Company, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 936), where an
infant of five years old, in charge of its
grandmother, was injured by a goodstrain in passing the track to the passenger carriages, and the jury found negligence, both in the servants of the company
and the grandmother, it was held no
recovery could be had for the injury in
the name of the child, in consequence
of its complete identification with the
grandmother in regard to the question
of negligence. And in Wright v. Malden 6- Mdrose Railroad Company, 4
Allen 283, it was decided that the negligence of a parent or other person who
has the care of a child of tender age
has the same effect in preventing the
maintenance of an action by the child,
for an injury occasioned by the negligence of others, that his own want of
due care could have if he was an adult ;
and to entitle him to recover in such
case it must appear that there was no
other culpable cause of the injury but
the fault of the defendants, or, at all
events, that his own want of ordinary
care, or that of those having him in
charge, did not contribute to its production. And it was here ruled by the
-ourt that the fact that a child two years
old is passing unattended across a public street, in a city, traversed by a horse
railroad, is, in itself, necessarily primd
facie evidence of neglect in those who
have it in charge.
But where the railroad is first in fault,
as in leaving a freight-train across the
highway for an unreasonable length of
time or without any justifiable excuses,

whereby a child of tender years was
induced to attempt to pass along the
street by passing between the cars.
whereby he suffered injury, it was very
justly held the company were responsible, notwithstanding any such attempt
in an adult might fairly be regarded as
rash and indiscreet: Rauch v. Lloyd, 7
Casey 358 ; Penn. Railway Company v
Kelly, Id. 372. And the same rule is
maintained in other cases . (Birge v.
Gardiner, 19 Conn. Rep. 507 ; Robinson
v. Cone, 22 Vt. Rep. 213).
In the last case cited we attempted to
show, from the decided cases and from
the reason and necessity of the case,
that where one found an infant of tender age in a position to suffer injury
from a vehicle or machinery under his
control, he was bound to the exercise
of Abe utmost caution not to inflict injury upon such infant; and that he had
no right to expect the same wise caution
and circumspection, in avoiding injury,
from such a child which would be indispensable in an adult, in order to entitle
him to maintain an action for such injury. We believe the courts will be
compelled ultimately to adopt some such
distinction between the ease of adults
and infants of tender age as in many
of the states has already been done, as
well as in England in the case of Lynch
v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29. See also Philadelphia 6- Reading Railroad Company v.
Spearen, 47 Penn. St. Rep. 300; Daley
v. Norwich 6- Worcester Railroad Company, 26 Conn. Rep. 591 ; Penn. Railroad Company v. Kelly, 31 Penn. St.
Rep. 372.
It was held in a very recent English
case (Hughes v. Maeho, 10 Jur. (N.
S.) 682 (1864)) that although a child
improperly and without any reasonable
excuse interfering with a cellar-door or
lid, carelessly left up by defendant, could
not recover damages for an injury thereby sustained, by reason of its own con-
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Lributory negligence; this will not preclude another child, standing near, and
who was injured by the fall of the lid,
from recovering damages, provided he
was not a joint actor with the former,
the injury being the result of the joint
negligence of the defendant and the
other child. This decision goes evidently upon the most reasonable grounds
that if aghild assumes to interfere with
matters he does not comprehend, he
makes himself responsible for the exer-

cise of a discretion adequate to the business he volunteers to undertake. But
if he is merely passive, others guilty
of negligence in regard to him will not
be able to excuse themselves from
responsibility because he did not exercise
the discretion of an adult in escaping the
consequences of the negligence of others.
This seems to point to the true distinction, in this respect, between the case
of infants of tender age and adults.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
MALTBY v. THE READING AND COLUMBIA RAILROAD CO.
Loans of railroad corporations are subject, in Pennsylvania, to a three-mill tax
upon the principal of the loans, though they be owned by a citizen of another state.
It is the duty of the corporation officers to retain the tax from the accruing
interest, whether it be payable on coupons or otherwise.
Such loans are property, in a taxable sense, here in Pennsylvania, and the Acts
of Assembly imposing the tax and regulating the mode of its collection are constitutional and valid.
The case of Jackson v. The Northern Central Railroad Co., in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Maryland, held not to be a correct exposie
tion of the Pennsylvania statutes.

CERTIFIED from Nisi Prius.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

J.-The plaintiff, a non-resident of Pennsylvania, held certain bonds of the Reading and Columbia Railroad
Company with coupons attached, representing the semi-annual
interest stipulated for in the body of each bond. Upon presenting
the coupons for. payment, the company claimed that it was their
right and duty to deduct and retain for the Commonwealth a state
tax equal to three mills on every dollar of the principal of the
bonds. To resist this claim and compel the company to pay the
coupons in full the plaintiff filed this bill in equity, upon which
three questions are made.
1st. Is the tax leviable at all under existing laws, upon the
loans of the company?
WOODWARD,.C.

MALTBY v. RAILROAD 00.

2d. If law exists to authorize the tax, are the loans taxable
-when hold and owned by a non-resident of the state ?
3d. If so taxable in the hands of a non-resident owner, is not
the company bound by the terms of its contract to pay the stipu.
lated interest to its creditor without a deduction of the tax ?
These questions embrace the whole case, and they shall be considered in their order.
1st. The taxableness of corporation loans depends upon the will
of the legislature with whom the taxing power is lodged, ahd that
will is to be gathered from the terms of Acts of Assembly. No
impression whatever is made upon such a question by arguing the
unreasonableness of taxing debts. It may be true that such a
policy te-ids to prevent capital from seeking investment in Pennsylvania; but this argument should be directed rather to the
legislature who make the laws, than to the courts whose duty it is
to expound them. The subjects of taxation, as well as the rate
of assessment, are selected and prescribed by the legislature.
Corporation loans are very conspicuous forms of property, and
depend for their existence and value upon the state government
-which authorizes them, and if, in the judgment of the legislature,
they ought to contribute to the support of the government that
protects them, and for this purpose are taxed, it avails nothing to
argue that the government ought to derive its support from other
kinds of property. Sic volo sic jubeo, is the language of a sovereign, and in respect to statetaxation of property within the state,
the Commonwealth is a sovereign power.
Our only question upon this part of the case is, therefore,
whether the Acts of Assembly do clearly manifest the legislative
intent to tax this species of property. The 32d section of the Act
of 29th April 1844, Purd. 949, enumerates the objects of taxation.
Real estate is first mentioned, and then personal estate, and among
the specifications under this latter head are "mortgages, and
money owing by solvent debtors, whether by promissory note,
penal or single bill, bond or judgment," and " all public loans or
stocks whatever, except those issued by the Commonwealth."
The 34th section provides for an assessment for the use of the
Commonwealth of three mills on every dollar of the value of the
properties enumerated in the 32d section. By virtue of various
Acts of Assembly, counties, boroughs, and school districts were
empowered to tax the same forms of property that were taxable
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for state purposes, and corporation loans having thus become
subject to these local taxes, the Act of 2d May 1854, Purd. 197,
entitled "An act to exempt certain loans and bonds from taxation," was passed, which declared, among other things, that "all
bonds or certificates of loans of any railroad company incorporated by this Commonwealth, be and the same shall be liable to
taxation for state purposes only."
Now, whether we derive the legislative intent from the words
" mortgages," or "moneys owing by solvent -debtors," or "all
public loans whatsoever," as found in the Act of 1844, or, rejecting all these words, place ourselves on the Act of 1854 alone, we
can be at no loss as to the legislative intent to tax such securities
as are in question here.
The coupons and bonds are secured by a mortgage, and constitute part of the mortgage-debt; they represent also sums owing
by a solvent debtor, and, in some sense, they are a public loan,
for they are authorized by the highest authority in the state, and
it would be no very strained construction to bring them under
either of these titles in the 82d section of the Act of 1844, and
if referrable to either, then clearly the loan or debt, and not
merely the accruing interest upon it, was taxable by that act.
And such must have been the general understanding of the enactment, else the Exemption Act ten years later would not have been
needed.
But if the terms of the Act of 1844 be thought incapable of
embracing the loan in question, it comes within the very words of
the Act of 1854. It is evidenced by bonds or certificates of loans,
and these were issued by a railroad company incorporated by this
Commonwealth, and such securities, says the Act of 1854, are and
shall be liable to taxation for state purposes only.
There is no possibility of mistaking the legislative will in'this
regard. It may be a reasonable or an unreasonable exercise of
will, but that it is clearly expressed is past all doubt. And it is
final. The power of taxation, which isthe corner-stone of the
government, is lodged exclusively with the legislature, and depends wholly on the discretion of that department. A wanton
abuse of it might be arrested by the judicial arm, but such an
interference could proceed only on the ground that the legislature
had transcended their legislative functions, and enacted something
more than a tax law. So long as they confine themselves iothat
VOL.
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which is in the nature of a tax law, their powers are subject to no
judicial review, they are only responsible to the people.
2d. As to the non-residence of the holder of the loan. It is
undoubtedly true that the legislature of Pennsylvania cannot impose a personal tax upon a citizen, of another state, but the constant practice is to tax property within our jurisdiction which
belongs to non-residents. Our land taxes have always been imposed without regard to the domicil of the owner. And so have
the taxes of stocks in banks and other incorporated companies.
Stocks and loans are personal property, and the domicil of tho
owner determines the rights of succession to such property, though
its situs, at the time of his death, determines the right of administration, but the legislative power of taxation does not depend upon
these distinctions. There must be jurisdiction over either the
property or the person of the owner, else the power cannot be
exercised, but where the property is within our jurisdiction and
enjoys the protection of our state government, it is justly taxable,
and it is of no moment that the owner who is required to pay the
tax resides elsewhere. The duties of sovereign and subject are
reciprocal, and any person who is protected by government in his
person or property, may be compelled to pay for that protection:
Hood's -Estate,9 Harris 114. In the case of The W'est tC.ester
School District v. Darlington, 2 Wright 157, effect was given to
an Act of Assembly which taxed property held here in trust for
non-resident minors. This principle of taxation, as the correlative
of protection, perfectly just in itself, is as applicable to a nonresident as to a resident owner, because civil government is essential to give value to any form of property, without regard to the
ownership, and taxation is indispensable to civil government,
What would the plaintiff's loan be worth if it were not for the
franchises conferred upon the company by the Commonwealth,
and which are maintained and protected by the civil and military
power of the Commonwealth ? Is it not apparent that the intrinsic
and ultimate value of the loan, as an investment, rests on state
authority-that it is the state which made it property, and preserves it as property? Then it would seem that this kind of
property, more than any other, ought to contribute to the support
of the state government. And I suppose it is upon this ground
that the legislature discriminates between corporation loans and
private debts, as objects of taxation. The artificial debtor, itself
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a creature of the legislative power, and all its functions derived
from legislative grant, is so dependent upon the government, it
lives and moveg and has its being so entirely by the favor of the
government, that not only what it owns, but what it owes also, is
thought fit to be taxed, whilst only the possessions of the natural
person and not his debts are taxed.
But it may be said, and indeed was urged in argument, that the
plaintiff's loan as.personal property follows his person, and is property for all pu poses only in the place where he has his domicil.
For some purposes, as already intimated, it is undoubtedly subject
to the law of the domicil, and yet in a very high sense it is also
property heb in Pennsylvania. It was admitted in argument
that corporation stocks are property here though owned beyond
our jurisdiction, and this is, indeed, a necessary consequence of
the final ruling which a long vexed question in the Supreme Court
of the United States received in the case of The Ohio and .Mississippi Railroad Co. v. TlTeeler, 1 Black 256, where it was held
that stockholders in railroad companies became, presumptively,
citizens of the state which creates the corporation. Property has
been defined to be the right or interest which one has in lands or
chattels, and so domestic is this peculiar species of property, that
it domesticates the owner.
But loans are not stocks, and yet the loans and stock of a railroad company resemble each other in many respects. Both are
subscribed under the authority of a special law, and both are so
far capital that they are employed for the same general purposes.
The certificate of stock which the plaintiff, as a citizen of Rhode
Island, may hold for shares in this company, is mere paper evidence of property existing here-it is not the thing signified, it is
only evidence of it. Is the bond which the plaintiff holds anything more ? He cannot enforce it where he lives, he must come
here to gather its fruits. It is founded upon and derives its value
from a mortgage, but that mortgage is here, and the franchises
and properties which the mortgage binds are within our jurisdiction. The bond signifies his right to receive so much money out
of the mortgaged estate, but that estate not only belongs to our
jurisdiction, but was in part created by our authority, and the
power to make the mortgage, like all the franchises of the company, were conferred by state authority.
Now, although loans and stocks are distinguishable for many
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purposes, yet the legislature committed no very great solecism in
treating loans as taxable property within our jurisdiction. The.
tax may be thought to be extravagant, especially in view of the
taxation to which the owner is exposed in the place of his residence, but that is a consideration for legislative attention. The
point we rule upon this part of the case is, that corporation loans,
though in some sense mere debts, are, like moneys at interest,
taxable as property. And moneys at interest have long been
taxed in Pennsylvania.
3d. Has the company the right to deduct the tax from the coupons. The 3d section of the Act of 30th April 1864, Purd. 1378,
provides that "1every president, treasurer, cashier, or" other officer
of any company incorporated, or that may hereafter be incorporated, which pays interest to its depositors, bondholders, or other
creditors, upon which by the laws of this Commonwealth a state
tax is imposed, shall, before payment of the same, retain from
said depositors, bondholders, or other creditors the amount of
state tax imposed by existing laws, and shall pay over the same
to the state treasurer," &c.
The purpose of this Act of Assembly was not to impose a tax,
but to prescribe a mode of collecting a tax, and the tax referred
to as the tax to be retained and paid over to the state treasurer,
is a tax upon interest accruing to bondholders and other creditors.
But the three-mill tax is imposed, not on the interest, but on the
principal of the plaintiff's bond. Here is a discrepancy undoubtedly, but it is more verbal than substantial. Taking the Act of
1864 in connection with the prior acts to which I have referred,
and reading them as parts of a legislative system for aiding the
revenues of the Commonwealth, they amount to this and no more,
that the three-mill tax shall be assessed upon the par value of the
corporation loan, and shall be retained by the corporation officers
out of the accruing interest thereon. The verbiology of Acts of
Assembly passed at different times, though in pursuit of a common
object, is very apt to be ambiguous and inartificial, and there is
not more difficulty in reconciling the terms of these several acts
than we are accustomed to encounter, but we must not allow a too
strict adherence to the words of the enactment to defeat the intent
of the legislature. In other words, the acts being in par matenia
must be so construed as to give due effect to each. It is in this
way only that we can arrive at an intelligible conclusion, and this
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is the mode by which we arrive at the above-stated result, that
the taxation of the bond is to be deducted from the accruing
interest. If the Act of 1864 be not applied to this tax upon the
principal debt, there is no tax to which it is applicable.
But this, it is said, violates the faith of the obligation, and
renders all such legislation void. The argument is, that the
company have contracted to pay so much interest to the plaintiff,
and the legislature cannot relieve them from this obligation.
How far modern tax laws. shall be permitted to impair and alter
private contracts, is a great question which must be decided ultimately by the Supreme Court of the United States. I have my
own private opinions, which would, possibly, be found to differ
from a majority of this court, but I do not think it worth while to
discuss the constitutionality of these Pennsylvania statutes whilst
the country acquiesces in the Excise Law of the General Government, under the operation of which the same question might be
frequently raised. For instance, a section of the Excise Law of
1864 authorized manufacturers, who had existing contracts for the
delivery of manufactured goods at the date of the law, to add the
increased duties to the contract price and collect them of the
vendee, and this is now done. So far as I know no question has
been raised under that law upon the inviolability of contracts, and,
perhaps, the sound conclusion is, that governmental taxation, a
thing always to be anticipated when contracts are made, does not
impair the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition. If this be conceded as a principle, then the
mode of collecting the tax, whether by a government agent, a
debtor corporation, or a manufacturer, is mere machinery and
involves no principle whatever. For the present, therefore, and
spealking for the court, I lay it down that the Acts of Assembly
to which I have referred are constitutional and valid; that they
tax the loan as property found here in Pennsylvania; and that
they appoint the debtor corporation the collector of that tax for
the benefit of the state government.
It may be added, that we have not overlooked, though we have
not cited, the opinion of Chief Justice CHASE in the case of Jackson v. The Yorthern Central Railway, lately decided in the
Circuit Court of the Uuitcd States for the District of 'Maryland,
wherein the learned Chief Justice reached a different conclusion
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from those above expressed, but it is apparent from his opinion
that he was unfamiliar with our tax laws, and overlooked altogether the Act of 1864. Doubtless counsel failed to bring it to
his notice.
The decree at Nisi Prius dismissing the plaintiff's bill
is affirmed.

Supreme Court of Ilinois.
NESMITH T. MANLY v. DANIEL L. PETTEE.
Where A. and B., who were equal owners as tenants in common of four tracts
of land, made quit-claim deeds to each other of portions of said land of about
equal value, dated October 23d 1856, intending thereby to carry into effect a parol
agreement to partition such lands, the deed from A. to B. being duly recorded
March 4th 1857, but that from B. to A. not being recorded until the 28th of
January 1862, and, in the meantime, on the 6th of May 1857, a judgment was
entered in favor of C. against B. : Held, that, under the registry laws of fllinois,
requiring "all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing relating to or
affecting the title to real estate" to be recorded in the county where situated, and
declaring that "all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments of writing, which are
required to be recorded, shall take effect and be in force from and after the time
of filing the same for record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent
purchasers, without notice," and that "all such deeds and title-papers shall be
adjudged void as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without notice, until
the same shall be filed for record," C.'s judgment was a lien upon an individual
half of the land allotted to A. in the parol partition, such partition having been
made before the judgment was rendered; whereas, had it been made after the
rendition of the judgment, the rule might have been otherwise.
W'here A., before the parol partition, had given a mortgage upon his individual
interest in the lands held in common, but in terms covering the whole of said lands,
to D., and on the day the partition-deeds were executed D. had released from the
mortgage the lands allotted to B., in consideration of one dollar "and other good
and valuable considerations," the release containing the following clause: "Hereby
intending to release the interest of B. in the lands embraced in said mortgage, and
retain as securityfor the payment thereof that portion of said lands now owned
by A. :" Held, that, as said clause related to a different interest from that claimed
to be bound by the lien of the judgment, to wit, to an interest formerly held by
A., the mortgagor, in the lands allotted to B., and not to an interest of B. in the
lands allotted to A., it could not be construed to give notice to C. of a partition
of the lands between A. and B.

ON the 23d of October 1856, one John M. Seward and one
William B. Herrick, being equal owners as tenants in common of
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certain lands situate on sections 11, 12, 18, and 14, township 40,
N. Range, 4, E., for the purpose of effecting a partition, executed
to each other quit-.claim deeds-Seward conveyed to Herrick his
interest in the land in section 18, and Herrick to Seward his
interest in the residue of the lands. The partition is proven to
have been fair and just. The deed to Herrick was recorded
March 4th 1857, and that to Seward not until January 28th 1862.
On the 25th of February 1857, Herrick mortgaged to one
Macalister the land allotted to him, to secure the payment of
$20,000, which mortgage was recorded March 7th 1857. On the
6th of March 1857, Petee, the defendant in error, recorded a
judgment in the Superior Court of Chicago against Herrick for
$8453, on which execution was issued within the year. Subsequently, Petee sued out another execution and was about to sell.
under it, an undivided half of the land in sections 1-1 and 12.
allotted to Seward in the partition, when Manly, the plaintiff in
error, who held by a series of conveyances under Seward, all of
which were made after the recovery of Pettee's judgment, filed
his bill in Chancery to enjoin the sale and quiet his title. The
case proceeded to a hearing, and the court below dismissed the
bill.
MTtiller

ewis, for plaintiff in error.

Jameson & Hibbard, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LAWRENCE, J.-It is urged by the plaintiff in error that, notwithstanding the non-registry of the deed from Herrick to Seward,
at the date of the recovery of judgment against the former, the
undivided half of the lands in sections. 11 and 12, which had
belonged to Herrick before the partition, and still stood in him
upon the record, was not subject to the lien of the judgment. It
is so claimed upon several grounds. The counsel for the plaintiff
in error first insists, inasmuch as the title of tenants in common is
several, and the only unity between them the unity of possession,
that a parol partition, if followed up by a several possession,
in accordance with the partition, is good, and that the plaintiff in
error should not be placed in a worse position in consequence of
failing to register his deed, than he would occupy if he had no
deed at all. This would be perfectly true if it had been such a
change from a joint to a several possession as would be necessary
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to make a parol partition good. For that purpose, at least as to
third persons, the several possession of the respective parties
must be so open and visible as to notify all persons interested in
having such knowledge, that a change of possession has occurred.
But in the case at bar there was no such change of possession as
would amount to a notice, or put parties upon inquiry. If there
had been, the question of parol partition would have been immaterial, inasmuch as a several possession, by each party of his own,
would have been notice of the unrecorded deed. But there was
no possession at all taken by Seward of his allotment prior to the
rendition of the judgment. This portion of the lands was, and continued to be, wholly unimproved. There was already a tenant on
the land allotted to Herrick, who remained in the same possession
that he had had before. Herrick himself caused some ploughing
to be done, and wood to be cut, before the rendition of the judgment.
This was all that would indicate a change of possession or a partition.
In order to affect third persons claiming a lien upon, or an interest in, the lands allotted to Seward, the title to an undivided half
of which the public records showed to be in Herrick, it is clear
that there must have been such a several possession by Seward of his
allotment as would at least put parties upon inquiry. We must
hold this, or we substantially repeal our registry laws. Those
laws place the purchaser and the judgment-creditor upon the
same footing, and if, under the circumstances of this case, the
defendant in error, instead of obtaining a judgment-lien, had purchased of Herrick the undivided half of the land allotted to Seward,
would it be contended that Herrick's possession of his allotment
would be notice of Seward's title to his, either by a parol partition,
or under an unrecorded deed ? It is a question about which there
can be no discussion; and the same rule must be applied to the
case of judgment-creditors.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error also insists, that where a
judgment or other lien is obtained against the undivided estate of a
t-nanit in common, and partition- is afterwards made, the lien follows the partition and attaches to all the premises set off to the
debtor, while the land allotted to his co-tenant or co-tenants is
discharged. There are many adjudged cases in which this has
been held, where the partition was effected by judicial proceedings,
and we agree with the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that it is
difficult to say why a different rule should be applied to a partition
by act of the parties, if the division is shown to have been fair
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and just. Whether this rule would be held to obtain in this state,
except at the option of the lien-holder, our statute requiring that
incumbrancers should be made parties to a proceeding in partition,
is a question upon which we do not desire to be understood as
expressing an opinion. In the case of Loomis v. 1-iley, 24 fI1.
307, it was decided that where a mortgage was made upon an
undivided interest, pending the suit for partition, the lien would
be confined to the premises allotted to the mortgagor, but that
case was decided solely on the ground that the incumbrance was
created pendente lite.
But conceding merely for the purposes of this case, all that is
claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, as to the ambulatory character of a lien created before partition upon the undivided estate of a tenant in common, we still cannot concur in the
inference thence drawn by counsel, that the same doctrine would
apply to a lien acquired after partition upon the estate of a tenant
in common, and without either actual or constructive notice that
a partition has been made. We speak, of course, of partition by
act of the parties, as, where the partition is by judicial proceedings, there would be constructive notice.
In regard to a lien obtained after partition without notice, the
equities of the parties, in connection with our registry law, would
be widely different from what they would be in the case of a lien
acquired before partition.
To illustrate from the case at bar. If Pettee had obtained his
judgment before partition, no injustice would be done to any parties by confining his lien after partition, to the land allotted in
severalty to Herrick. The division of the premises being just, he
would have the same amount of property out of which to make his
debt, that lie would have had if the lands had remained undivided.
And if there had been a lien elder than his, as in the Macalister
mortgage in the actual state of facts, Pettee would still occupy no
worse position, by holding that his lien followed the partition. He.
could still subject to his judgment the same amount of property
that he could have reached had there been no partition. And.
which is the material thing to be considered, his partition would
in no respect be made worse in consequence of Seward's failure
to record the deed from Herrick, by which the partition was in
part effected, or in consequence of his having neither actual nor
constructive notice that a partition had been made. He would
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have become the creditor of Herrick upon the faith that Herrick
owned only an undivided half of the lands; and he is neither
deceived nor injured by having that undivided transmuted into a
divided half of equal value, without notice to him, and by a
private arrangement between the parties.
But how would his equities be affected by holding that the lien
follows the partition and is restricted by it, in the actual state of
facts ? By the public records of the county, upon the faith of
which men have the right to act, at the time Pettee obtained his
judgment, Herrick was the sole owner of the land on section 18,
and as owner of an undivided half of the lands on sections 11 and
12, which had been conveyed to Seward by the unrecorded deed.
We are not permitted to repeal our registry laws by distinctions
drawn from the common-law definition of a tenancy in common,
and by the doctrine that a partition of such estate is simply a
severance of the unity of possession. While all this is true, as
urged by the counsel .for the plaintiff in error, the broad fact
remains, plain and undeniable, that notwithstanding the partition,
Herrick was still, upon the records, the owner of an undivided
half of the lands on sections 11 and 12; and all persons had the
right, in the absence of notice from some other source, to purchase
from him, or to furnish him credit and take a lien, acting upon the
belief that those records showed the absolute truth as to the title.
When Pettee furnished the credit upon which his judgment was
afterwards obtained, the law presumes that he furnished it upon
the faith that Herrick was the owner of all real estate which stood
in his name upon the records, and for sake of 6ertainty, the presumption is madte to apply to the time when Pettee obtained his
judgment. This presumption may not have been true, as a matter
of fact, but it is the theory upon whici our recording laws
give purchasers and judgment-creditors the same degree of protection, and is one of those legal presumptions which the law does
not permit to be disputed.
Having then, given credit, as the law presumes, upon the faith
that Herrick owned an undivided half of the lands in sections 11
and 12, and the Macalister mortgage for $20,000 having priority
as to the land in section 13, can we restrict him to his junior lien
upon the latter land, merely because we might do so, if his judgment had been obtained before the partition was made ? In the
one case, the ladhes of Seward in failing to record the deed, could

MANLY v. PETTEE.

have neither injured nor misled him. In the other, the law pre
sumed it to have misled him; and if we were to apply the doctrine
insisted upon by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, would take
from him the 'means of securing payment of a debt, which upon
the theory of our registry law in protecting judgment-creditors he
would not have contracted, if the deed had been recorded. It is
undoubtedly hard that a portion of the land, which in fact belongs
to Seward or his grantees, should be taken for the payment of
Herrick's debts; but it is the consequence of Seward's own negli
gence, and the hardship is no greater than in any other case in
which a second is preferred to a first purchaser who has failed to
record his deed. The law furnished Seward the means of protecting his title, and if he neglected to avail himself of them,
neither he nor his grantees can claim any equity against him who
has dealt with Herrick upon the faith which the law authorized
him to place in the public records.
There is another circumstance in this case to which we have not
yet adverted, and upon which the counsel for the plaintiff in error
places some reliance, as notice to Pettee of the unrecorded deed.
Before the partition, John M. Seward made a mortgage upon all
these lands to John B. Seward, purporting to convey the entire
title. On the same day that John M. Seward quitelaimed to Herrick the north half of section 13, John B. Seward released the
same land from the lien of the mortgage. The deed of release
contained the following clause: "hereby intending to release the
interest of William B. Herrick in the lands enibraced in said
mortgage, and retain as security for the payment thereof that
portion of said lands now owned by John Ml. Seward." The release
related only to the north half of section 13, and referred to the
mortgage by its date, and the volume and page of its record, and
in no other way. The deed purports to be made upon consideration of one dollar, "and other good and valuable considerations."
No allusion whatever is made in it to a partition between John H.
Seward and Herrick, or to the deed from the latter. The release
was duly recorded.. What there is in this recital to give any indi:
cation to Pettee of a partition having been made, we are unable to
perceive. The instrument releases the lien of the mortgage upon
a title which Seward had held to land in section 13. It reserves
the lien of the mortgage upon all other lands covered by the mortgage and owned by John Al. Seward. How can this indicate that
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Herrick had lost his title to any portion of his own estate ? The
release taken in connection with the quitclaim-deed from John M.
Seward, notwithstanding the latter purported to be upon consideration of one dollar, no more indicated a partition of these lands
held in common, than it did any other transaction by means of
which Herrick had acquired Seward's title, and had arranged with
the mortgagee to release his lien. The form and consideration of
the deed indicated nothing, as such deeds are not at all peculiar
to cases of partition.
Besides, neither the deed from John M. Seward to Herrick, nor
the release from John B. Seward, as they related only to the land
owned by John M1. Seward, in section 13, lay in the chain of Herrick's title to a different tract of land, and were not, therefore,
instruments which- a purchaser from Herrick of such different
tract would have been obliged to notice, and the same rule would
hold as to a judgment-creditor. In no manner whatever could
the Sewards encumber or diminish Herrick's estate, and a person
dealing with him in regard to his estate in certain lands, would
be under no obligation to search the records, for the purpose of
ascertaining -what recitals John B. Seward had thought proper to
introduce into an instrument made by him; and relating not to the
title of Herrick, but to the estate of another person, with whom
Pettee, the judgment-creditor, had nothing whatever to do.
It is also urged that Herrick's several possession of the land in
section 13, is constructive notice of Seward's several title to the
lands allotted to him in the parol partition. We have already
incidentally said all that 'we deem necessary on this point in
speaking of partition by parol.
Decree affirmed.
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DORRIS v. COPELIN.
A bill of lading given by a steamer navigating the Western rivers, which contains the "privileges of lighting and reshipping," will be construed as granting
to the vessel the privilege of reshipping daring the voyage, according as its interest
or convenience may advise, and as at the same time imposing upon it the duty to
do so when practicable and necessary.

DORRIS vs. COPELIN.
The privilege cannot be exercised before the voyage has been undertaken or
commenced by the original vessel. It would not justify the steamer, which gives
such a bill of lading, in shipping and transporting the cargo by another vessel.
In this there would be such a departure from the contract as would render the
original vessel liable as insurer.
Lighterage does not apply to overloading at the commencement of a voyage.
EXCEPTIONS

to libel.

James 0. BroadhJead, for libellant.
J. ff. Bankin, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRE& , J. -This is a suit on a contract of affreightment, by
which the respondent agreed to transport, on the steamer Benton,
from St. Louis to Fort Benton, the cargo named in the bill of
lading, with the "privileges of lighting and reshipping." The
cargo was delivered to the Benton at St. Louis, and by her, before leaving port or commencing the voyage, shipped on another
steamer, which, with the cargo, was lost by an excepted peril.
The questions raised relate to the rights, duties, and privileges
of the boat and owners under the clause quoted.
The right and duty of a master to tranship when the vessel
receives a deadly wound, or cannot, from an excepted peril, prosecute the voyage, are well settled. "The privilege of reship.
piny" is obviously for the purpose of securing some authority
which otherwise would not exist,-a privilege which has become
very important in the navigation of western rivers. Steamers of
different draft and capacity are required in different departments
of western commerce, owing to the shallowness of water in some
rivers, and to rapids in others. A steamer which can make a
voyage at one state of a river, may not be able, at another, to
reach the port of destination; and instead of waiting indefinitely
for a, rise, needs the privilege of forwarding the cargo on another
steamer of lighter draft. It is well known that the condition of
some western rivers changes very suddenly; and unless the contract of affreightment makes provision therefor, serious disputes
must arise between the shipper and vessel, and great embarrassments ensue. Hence the clause in question is not of unfrequent
occurrence. The adjudications upon its force and effect, however,
are few, and not always consistent with each other.
It seems to be-well settled that when a reshipment is made on a
good boat under such a clause, the original vessel continues liable
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under its contract for the safe delivery of the cargo at the port of
destination, just as if the cargo had gone forward on the orighial
bottom. The original vessel continues liable for all losses not
within the excepted perils, and the shipper is not responsible for
extra freight, as in cases of transhipment under the general law.
The rules governing contracts of affreightment differ in no essential respect from those controlling other contracts. The contracting party must do what he agrees to do, according to the terms
of his undertaking. If he departs froni his agreement, he becomes
an insurer. One vessel may be selected by the shipper in preference to all others, for reasons satisfactory to himself, and founded
on the quality of the vessel, the character of her officers, the
facility for procuring insurance, &c.; and if the cargo is sent forward on a different vessel, the responsibilities of an insurer arise:
Dunseth v. Wade, 2 Scam. 285; MucGregor v. Kilmore, 6 Hammond 358; Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610; Flanders on
Shipping, § 481; Wkitesides v. Bussell, 8 W. & S. 44; Parsons
on Mercantile Law 124 n., 218 n.; Dalzell v. Saxon, 10 La.

(An.) 280.
Whether such a clause imposes a duty as well as grants a
privilege is not fully settled. In Louisiana (ffatchett v. The
Compromise, 12 La. (An.) 783) it is construed as obligatory;that is, if the vessel cannot make the voyage within a reasonable
time, it must reship, when practicable and necessary, at its own
expense ; and that low water is not an excepted peril. In Broadwell v. Butler, 1 Newberry 171, 6 McLean 296, also in Sturgess
v. The Columbus, 23 Mo. 230, it is held that the clause is a mere
privilege, to be exercised or not; but that custom may be proved
to explain the force of the terms.
Without the aid given by the foregoing authorities, the rights
and duties of the master are easily deducible from general principles. The master under the ordinary contract of affreightment
must transport the goods in his own vessel, unless prevented by
an excepted peril. Under certain circumstances he must tranship-that is, when the voyage is broken up by an excepted peril;
and the cost of the transhipment, beyond the original freightmoney, falls upon the cargo. He has no right to reship merely
to suit his own convenience or interest; for within the excepted
perils, the shipper contracts to have the cargo go forward in the
original vessel. If he wishes "the privilege of reshipping," he

DORRIS v. COPELIN,

must specially contract therefor. Treating the clause, therefore,
in connection with the reasons for its insertion, it must be considered as granting to the original vessel the privilege of reshipping during the voyage at its convenience ; and as, at the same
time, imposing the duty to do so when practicable and necessary.,
If no special exception therefor be inserted, the contract calls for
the delivery of the cargo within a reasonable time, to be ascertained, when the privilege to reship exists, by the practicability
of sending it forward on the original or some other vessel. It is
not to be supposed that the shipper concedes the privilege, if the
vessel may detain the cargo indefinitely, waiting for high water,
when vessels of less draft are making the voyage daily. It is a
privilege with corresponding obligations. The master may earn
freight by proceeding on his own vessel as far as practicable, and
then using another for the completion of the voyage. He is not
bound to reship, if he can complete the destined voyage ; but he
may do so. He must, however, send the cargo forward without
unreasonable delay, either on his own or another vessel.
The contract implies also that the voyage shall be undertaken,
or commenced, by the original vessel ; else why the agreement to
transport on the Benton at all, or why not an agreement with her
owner or master, to transport the cargo on any vessel, or to
transport generally, without reference to the vehicle or means of
transportation? It is well known that a voyage from St. Louis
to Fort Benton is not unattended with difficulties, owing to the
sudden rise and fall of the Missouri river, and to the necessity of
strong and powerful boats. A part of that voyage-say from St.
Louis to St. Joseph or Council Bluffs-may often be performed
by a large boat, when for the residue of the voyage one of lighter
draft will be needed. Shall the shipper have no benefit from his
selection of the boat which is to undertake the voyage? He concedes the privilege of re-shipment, so as to relieve the master of
the duty to complete the voyage on the original vessel; but can
that be justly termed a re-shipment which is, for all practical purposes, the original shipment? Has the steamer Benton performed
her contract by simply lying at the St. Louis wharf aad having
the cargo rolled across her decks to a steamer by her side, or by
going through the useless show of putting the cargo into her hold
and immediately hoisting it therefrom and transferring it to
another boat, without having turned a wheel or unfastened her
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moorings ? Is such a transaction different in any essential particular from a direct loading of the cargo, in the first instance, on
the other vessel ?
As the main point presented by the exceptions in this case is,
so far as known, now to be decided for the first time, and as the
views of the courts which have passed upon some questions arising
under a similar clause are not in entire accord, it is well to con.
sider the subject in connection with the origin of such a clause,
the necessities from which it springs, the nature of the inland
navigation to which it generally applies, and the real intentions
of the shipper and shipowner..
A voyage, for instance, from New Orleans to St. Paul by a
boat usually employed in the New Orleans trade, would be impracticable during many months in the year; yet some of the
lower river boats might at times accomplish the object. The
boat-owner thinking from the stage of the river such a voyage
practicable, may contract in New Orleans to deliver cargo on his
boat at St. Paul. If none but the usual exceptions were inserted
in the bill of lading, low water would not be an excuse for nonperformance, or for sending forward the cargo on another boat.
The case of Collier v. Swinney, 16 Mo. 484, illustrates the
doctrine. The voyage would have to be made by the 'original
vessel within a reasonable time, unless prevented by a recognised
peril, within the exceptions. The shipper might prefer to have
his cargo go forward without breaking bulk or rehandling. The
boat-owner, however, being unwilling to enter into an unqualified
obligation to that extent, asks the privilege of reshipping; and it
is conceded. What is meant by that qualification? That the
original vessel shall do nothing, or that she shall undertake the
voyage in good faith?
It is generally the case that western boats take large cargoes,
belonging to many different persons, procured at different places
along the river, and delivered at different ports. It may be of
great importance, sometimes, for a boat to have the privilege of
reshipping even when the voyage could, be made without delay or
difficulty; for a full return cargo may be offered at an intermediate port, and the cost of continuing the original voyage with the
little cargo still on board, would far exceed the freight-money.
Hence the shipowner needs the privilege of " reshipping," so as
to secure the profitable use of his vessel under all the shifting
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exigencies of a long coasting voyage ; and the shipper is interested in having his goods sent forward in safety and with as little
delay as practicable. Low water may cause a delay equally per
nicious to shipper and shipowner. For their mutual benefit, based
on the character of our river navigation, and each party having a
common object in view, viz.: the safe and speedy transportation
of the cargo,-the clause for " reshipment" is inserted in the contract, and becomes one of its important elements. Like all mutual
agreements of that description, it implies a duty. The contract
by the shipowner is, then, that he will transport the goods in a
reasonable time to their destined port, on his own vessel, or by
reshipping when necessary and practicable. He can consult his
own interest and convenience so far as earning freight is concerned, by reshipping at any point during the voyage; and at
the same time must consult the interests of the shipper by expediting tle transportation, even by resort to another vessel, if from
low water or other causes the original vessel cannot go forward,
safely or expeditiously.
The maritime rules applicable to navigation of the high seas,
if applied with technical rigor to all cases on the western rivers,
would frequently work gross injustice to all parties in interest.
It is apparent that many of those rules require modifications, or
rather modified and entirely new applications. A history of the
decisions as to " deviations," especially in the Supreme Court of
Missouri, illustrates the difficulties and embarrassments to shippers
and shipowners in the West, when such technical rulings are
rigidly adhered to, without due regard to underlying and fundamental principles. Those technical rules for sea voyages are correct applications of sound principles to the facts and circumstances
attending such navigation; but an adherence to such technical
rules, regardless of the peculiarities of western river navigation,
is a sacrifice of principle to inapplicable precedents-is a perversion or change of the contract as made between the parties.
They contract with reference to a particular voyage and mode of
transportation, differing in important respects from an open sea
voyage. Generally the master, shipper, and shipowner can have
prompt communication *ith each other. The necessity of sacrificing the cargo to procure supplies for finishing the voyage, or
the means of repairing the vessel when damaged by unavoidable
accident, seldom occurs. Hence the master's duties vary; or
VOL. XIV.-32
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rather the power inherent in his position is rarely called into
rightful action, so far as selling the cargo or vessel is concerned.
Hence some courts in the West have been liberal in allowing
proof of custom; and still more liberal in relaxing the strict rules
concerning the nature and proof of custom; or, if the courts lay
down the rigid rule, juries in common-law cases find the existence
of the custom on slender proofs. All of this indicates merely a
positive conviction in the minds of judges and juries, that a technical and strict following of inapplicable precedents would defeat
the object of -the law, and the real intention of the parties. In
maritime as well as other contracts the intention of the partiesthe substance instead of the shadow-should control the interpretation. Most of the maritime rules have sprung from the necessities of commerce. Vessels "are made to plough the seas and
not to rot by the wall ;" and hence whatever is necessary to the
successful use of the vessel has been encouraged and enforced by
legal tribunals, until a system of rules has ripened into existence
and become recognised in all maritime countries. Those rules
sprung from, and are peculiarly applicable to, foreign sea-voyages ;
.yet most of them are equally applicable to river navigation in the
West. Under the United States constitution, inter-state navigation is cognisable by Federal tribunals, and governed by general,
not local, rules and legislation. The United States Supreme
Court has frequently decided, that mercantile contracts are to be
interpreted in United States courts by general mercantile law,
not by the peculiarities springing from state or local legislation.
Taking, then, the fundamental principles controlling contracts of
affreightment and applying them fairly and justly to such contracts for transportation on western rivers, there will be no conflict
of authority and no departure from established rules. But courts
must not close their eyes to essential differences in the nature of
special contracts, nor to the real character of the subject-matter.
A contract made with reference to one transaction must not be
interpreted as if made with reference to an entirely different
object. Such a course would be "to stick in the bark"-to
sacrifice the substance to the form-right to show-the spirit to
the letter. The ancient and modern rules governing buildingcontracts illustrate the advance of jurisprudence and the adaptation
of law to the shifting exigencies of society and business pursuits.
Adjudications, or precedents, as they are termed, are never to be
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departed from on slight grounds; but are to be considered for
the purpose of ascertaining the principle recognised; not to be
followed blindly, regardless of the new elements a case may
contain.
The clause in western bills of lading securing the privilege of
reshipping and of lighterage has sprung from the peculiarities and
necessities of western navigation; which, if ignored in interpretation, would work an entire change in the contract; defeating the
end sought to be effected, viz.: the safe and speedy transportation
of cargoes, to the benefit of both shipper and shipowner. The
shipowner can now, under that clause, contract with safety for the
transportation of cargoes from Pittsburgh or New Orleans even to
Fort Benton in Montana ; and such a contract binds him to deliver
the goods at the destined port, by his own or some other vessel, so
soon as he reasonably can. If during the voyage there is a fall'
in the river under such circumstances as renders it imbrobable
that the original vessel can complete the voyage within a reasonable time, or during that season, and another boat of lighter draft
can and does make the voyage and is willing to take the cargo, it
would hardly be considered a fair performance of the contract to
hold on to the original cargo with the hope of pursuing the voyage
the following year, and in the mean time keep it on board subject
to the usual dangers attendant upon the breaking up of ice in
spring, or to store it over winter at an inaccessible place, subject
to great loss in value, or to its destruction if perishable. The
shipper contracts for a delivery in a reasonable time according to
the usual course of navigation on the specified river or rivers, and
the vessel is bound, in good faith, to fulfil the contract according
to its tenor. If no clause for "1reshipment" were inserted, the
vessel would have to take forward the goods on its own bottom;
for it would then appear that both parties agreed thereto. If
necessary delay resulted therefrom, such delay would be a necessary incident to the contract the parties chose to make. A delivery of goods for such a voyage at a particular season of the year,
ought, so far as delays are concerned, to be considered in connection with the difficulties of-navigation at such a season. A delivery for a voyage to Fort Benton, for instance, if made at St.
Louis in midwinter, would not imply that the cargo was to be
landed at Fort Benton in as few weeks thereafter as if delivered
in the spring, when the Missouri river is free from ice and the
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vessel would meet the June rise on the Upper Missouri. A
delivery for transportation the whole distance on one vessel would
subject shipper and shipowner to the necessary incidents of such
a voyage;. for they could, if they desired, insert the clause for
lighterage and reshipment. They can make their contract as
they desire to have it; and when made must abide by its terms.
In this case the respondent bound himself to undertake the
voyage on the steamer Benton, and secured the right to re-ship.
He did not commence the voyage as agreed, nor did he, within
the true meaning of his contract, re-ship ; for re-shipment implies
a previous shipment. Practically, the goods delivered for the
steamer Benton were never shipped on her at all; and consequently were never re-shipped by her. The argument of respondent's proctor, that the "1privilege of lighting" should be
treated as covering this case, involves a misapplication of terms.
'KLighterage" has a distinct meaning, and does not apply to overloading at the commencement of a voyage. If it be true that the
steamer Benton contracted for a larger cargo than she could
carry, the consequences of such greed must fall, not on the
shipper, but on herself. The owners of the cargo who may have
procured insurance for their shipments on that vessel, could not
be thus deprived of the benefits for which they stipulated. It is
not a " lighting" of a vessel, to take more cargo than she can
carry and then transport the excess on a " lighter." Such action
is neither " lighting," nor, in the true meaning of such a contract,
a re-shipment. The rule and reasons therefor may be thus succinctly recapitulated :-Inasmuch as a vessel -hich cannot perform 'a stipulated voyage within a reasonable time in consequence
of low water, or which may not be able to complete a voyage when
commenced, in consequence of a fall in the river; and inasmuch
as low water is not a peril of the river within the meaning of an
ordinary contract of affreightment, whereby the right or duty of
transhipment at the expense of the shipper arises; the mutual
interests of both shipper and shipowner often lead to a special
clause or contract concerning lighting and re-shipping. Each of
the contracting parties expects to be benefited thereby. The
shipper seeks to avoid the delays incident to navigation by.that
particular class of boats on the specified route. His object is to
secure the speedy and safe transportation of his goods; and for
that purpose he is willing that the vessel on which the shipment is
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made, may, if during the voyage the master deems it necessary or
proper, re-ship on some other good vessel. His interests are thus
promoted: the original vessel being still liable on her contract,
for the delivery of the cargo, within the excepted perils. On the
other hand, the shipowner may, for satisfactory reasons, either of
interest or convenience, wish to abandon an uncompleted voyage
without loss of freight pro rata itineris, and without becoming an
insurer. He, therefore, agrees to the special clause. Each contracting party thus secures himself against a contingency. Each
is benefited by the arrangement if mutual good faith is observed;
and each has a right to insist upon the terms of the contract. It
is not unilateral,or one-sided-a mere privilege without corresponding obligations. It becomes as much a part of the mutual
contract as any other provision in it. The shipowner cannot hold
the cargo indefinitely, although it may be perishable, or the loss
of a market may follow, and defend his action on the ground, that
inasmuch as the clause is a " privilege," it is for him, regardless
of the interests of the shipper, to act upon it or not. The relation
which binds the ship to the cargo would be thus annihilated, and
the shipper placed at the mercy of the master or shipowner. So
the shipper cannot insist upon having the vessel proceed on the
voyage, regardless of expense and hazards. It is well known that
other interests are often intimately associated with the voyageas those of the underwriters, consignors, and vendors. The rules
governing such contracts should be sufficiently comprehensive to
include and protect the rights of all. The old contracts of affreightment, policies of marine insurance, power of masters over
the vessel and cargo, not being strictly applicable in all particulars
to other than foreign sea-voyages, have been largely varied when
used in connection with inter-state navigation on our western
rivers, so as to adapt them to the necessities of such river commerce. Adherence to the principles on which all such contracts
rest, demands their application to the rightful ends for which they
exist. The custom of the rivers and the introduction of special
clauses in contracts of affreightment, the modifications of policies
of insurance, &c., have been gradually working out their needed
adaptation to the exigencies of river navigation. Although a
river voyage from a port in one state to a port in another, is considered, for some purposes, a foreign vqyage, and the rules applicable thereto enforced ; yet, in many respects, it differs essentially
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from a foreign sea-voyage. To ignore those differences would be
to overturn sound principles and destroy right and justice.
The clause concerning lighting and reshipment thus interpreted
with due regard to the intention of the parties and the peculiarities
of river navigation, is beneficial to all concerned and promotive
of commerce. It deals justly with the shipper and shipowner.
Hence, it must be held to give to the shipowner the right, during
a voyage, to re-ship for his own interest and convenience, and to
impose on him the duty of so doing when practicable and necessary. The privilege to re-ship is not the privilege of converting
the original vessel into a mere receiving-ship--to have her hold
out the false inducement that the voyage is to be undertaken by
her, and thus mislead the shipper into making all collateral
arrangements and contracts, as of insurance, &c., to the destruction of his interests. A shipment on a specified steamer for a
prescribed voyage with the privilege of reshipment, implies that
the original steamer shall undertake the, voyage-that the privilege may be exercised during the voyage, and not before-that
there shall be un actual and not a merely ostensible shipment in
the first case. By the ordinary contract the shipowner is bound
to take the cargo to the port of destination on the boat named, so
soon as he reasonably can, the perils of the river excepted. To
send the-goods forward within a reasonable time as stipulated, on
his own or some other vessel, he secures the privilege of reshipment,-that is, exemption from the obligation to send them
forward on the boat named. He secures no other exemption.
All his other obligations are intact. He must still transport the
cargo in a reasonable time, either on his own or another vessel,
subject to all the other conditions and obligations of the ordinary
contract. If he fails to do so, a breach of the contract occurs,
for which he is liable.

